Abstract
AbstractThis article argues that the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of what amounts to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice undermines God's freedom and the contingency of creation. I further suggest and reject four possible ways for Theistic Compatibilists to respond to this problem in light of their metaphysical commitments to freedom and explanation. I close with discussion of a possible way for Theistic Compatibilists to avoid this problem.
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