Abstract
AbstractLinda Zagzebski refers to the denial of both determinism and PAP, the principle of alternate possibilities, as the newest solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and moral responsibility. William Lane Craig and David Hunt have appealed to Frankfurt cases in support of the claim that libertarian freedom and moral responsibility do not presuppose the truth of PAP: a person is morally responsible only if she could have done otherwise. I argue that this so-called hyper-incompatibilist perspective has an absurd implication: one could be responsible for some of one’s essential properties. Thus, one cannot jettison the principle of alternate possibilities to reconcile divine foreknowledge with moral responsibility.
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