Divine Command Theory

Abstract

A divine command theory of morality contends that actions are morally required if and only if and because God commands those actions. An action is morally permissible if and only if and because God permits that action. An action is morally wrong if and only if and because God prohibits that action. The word “because” here refers to an immediate and direct dependence relationship. Defenders include John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Piere d’Ailly, Jean Gerson, Gabriel Biel, Francisco Suarez, Descartes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, George Berkeley, John Gay, William Paley, and John Austin. In the early twentieth century, most philosophers believed a line of argument pressed in Plato’s dialogue: the Euthyphro discredited divine command theories. However, they underwent a revival in the 20th-century analytic philosophy of religion due to the seminal works of Philip Quinn and Robert Adams. Their theories will be discussed in this article (see Formulating the Theory). The viability of divine command theories remains at the forefront of discussions about the relationship between religion and morality. This work will focus mainly on the development and debate around divine command theories in contemporary analytic philosophy, though some historical references will be discussed.