Divided Government and Constitutional Reform in France and Germany

Abstract

The constitutional reforms in France and Germany moved the potential for divided government to complicate governance in opposite directions. This outcome highlights the limits of constant-cause analyses of institutional reform. While theoretical models of institutional change that embrace constant-cause explanations may be able to account for the recent expansion of the Bundesrat's power, they are unable to account for the French amendment to reduce the presidential mandate (Article 6), whose purpose was to prevent the recurrence of divided government. Indeed, constant-cause models predict that constitutional reforms will in all cases expand the universe of political strategies, not limit it. The French reform does not preclude the recurrence of cohabitation; it does, however, make it less likely. By focusing on critical junctures in each country's constitutional history, a contextualized historical analysis of divided government and constitutional reform in France and Germany accounts for this outcome and demonstrates the strength of path-dependent explanations.