Abstract
The interaction between Russia and Gulf countries represents the story of ups and downs, severe conflicts and sharp warmings that can largely be explained by the permanently changing role and place of each of these players at the global and Middle Eastern political arenas. After Russia's “return” to the Middle East in 2012–2015, Moscow's foreign policy towards the Gulf can be explained in terms of a bargaining strategy. On the one hand, Russia is trying to underline its importance and relevance to the GCC by putting forward diplomatic and political initiatives. The Kremlin uses its direct or indirect presence in the key regional conflicts such as the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni civil wars as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear issue. On the other hand, Russia is interested in building up stronger economic cooperation with the GCC, drawing bigger volumes of investments from the Gulf to Russia’s broken economy, as well as coordinating efforts with Saudi Arabia in the global oil market. While, in the near future, the qualitative evolution of Russia’s relations with the GCC is hardly possible, there are still options for their deepening within the current level of interaction between Moscow and the Gulf.
Highlights
During the second part of 2010s, Russian relations with the GCC have developed on a largely positive trajectory
Even Moscow’s decision to leave the OPEC + agreement and launch a price war with Saudi Arabia in March 2020 did not threaten the gains made by Russian diplomacy in the region
Kozhanov of the Assad regime in Syria, the overall rapprochement continued based on a complex mixture of factors that include the growing intensity of Moscow’s presence in the region, changing dynamics of the US relations with Russia and the GCC, the evolution within energy markets, existing tensions between Middle Eastern countries, as well as the transformation of GCC foreign policy vision
Summary
During the second part of 2010s, Russian relations with the GCC have developed on a largely positive trajectory. This means that Moscow needs to demonstrate its importance to the regional players Under these circumstances, Moscow’s active attempts to maintain good ties with the warring sides in Yemen, its support provided to General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, active cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the OPEC + and readiness to open Syria for the economic presence of the GCC countries are, among all, aimed to make the Gulf states take the Kremlin’s worldview into account and to keep communication channels with Moscow open. Moscow retains its own level of mistrust towards countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE while seeing Iran as an occasional partner in its efforts to counterbalance US plans in the region This in turn makes Riyadh and Abu Dhabi skeptical about Russia’s abilities to put pressure on Iran, for instance, when it comes to decreasing Tehran’s presence in Syria. This means that, following a stabilization of oil markets, Russian oil producers could try to leave the OPEC + again
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