Abstract
ABSTRACT In EU trade policy literature it is common knowledge that EU member states can initiate, postpone and even block trade negotiations. Their importance therefore is of great significance but knowledge on member governments’ trade policy preferences is very limited. Main aim of this article is to close this research gap by calling for a stronger focus on the domestic politics towards EU trade policy-making by examining member governments’ trade policy preferences. Numerous trade negotiations have illustrated that these preferences can considerably diverge in cross-country comparison. The most recent example are the EU-U.S. trade negotiations. Why did governmental trade policy preferences towards the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) differ? Novel here is the application of the societal approach to governmental preference formation which primarily focuses on domestic-level variables, sectoral interests and value-based ideas, in shaping governmental trade positions. The relationship between these independent variables is examined in order to illustrate which of these was more dominant and under which conditions, in shaping British and German governmental trade policy preferences during TTIP negotiations.
Published Version
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