Abstract
Schizophrenia and autism are today considered complex spectrum disorders characterized by difficulties in social behavior. Drawing on recent advances in collective or shared intentionality studies, we present a novel theoretical approach to these social difficulties by exploring them from the angle of shared intentionality. We begin by describing two forms of shared intentionality: joint intentionality and we-intentionality. Joint intentionality crucially relies on the agents' mentalizing abilities such as mind reading and the ability to factor in (or “to be moved” by) their partner's intentions in deliberation and action planning. By contrast, we-intentionality relies on the agents' capacity to understand themselves as group members and to adopt the group's perspective. In schizophrenia spectrum disorders, we propose that joint intentionality remains unaffected, but we-intentionality may be impaired. In severe autism spectrum disorder (i.e., infantile autism), we propose that both forms of shared intentionality are impaired. We suggest that the source of the problems affecting we-intentionality in schizophrenia spectrum disorders lies primarily in trait-like, anomalous self-experiences. In severe autism spectrum disorder, we suggest that problems with mind reading, the ability to “be moved” by others' intentions, and with the capacity for perspective-taking impede both forms of shared intentionality.
Highlights
In the last decades, collective or shared intentionality has attracted rapidly growing attention in many research communities
We argue that the problems with mentalizing abilities and the capacity for perspective-taking, which the current literature has already acknowledged as a qualifying trait of severe autism spectrum disorder (ASD), have negative repercussions for initiating interactions based on both joint intentionality and we-intentionality (We-Intentionality in Severe Autism Spectrum Disorder section
We have proposed that shared intentionality comes in at least two different forms, namely, joint intentionality and weintentionality, and we have suggested that these two forms require different psychological preconditions to be established and maintained
Summary
Collective or shared intentionality has attracted rapidly growing attention in many research communities. The individual should be aware of what has been labeled “group cues” [49], which include having common interests, sharing a common fate, facing a competing group, and using we-language [(43); we return to these cues in We-Intentionality in Severe Autism Spectrum Disorder section, where we shall discuss a important cue, namely, joint attention]. There is a long tradition of research on theory of mind deficits in schizophrenia [93] While such deficits perhaps may exert friction on the process of group identification and weintentionality, these deficits do generally not appear to be so severe that they hamper the psychological preconditions for joint intentionality in SSD (we discuss this issue in the end of Joint Intentionality in Severe Autism Spectrum Disorder section). We conclude that both joint intentionality and weintentionality are impaired in severe ASD, since the psychological preconditions of these forms of shared intentionality appear not to be met
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