Abstract
This article examines the relationship between legislative centrism (or conversely, extremism) and the distribution of federal outlays. A substantial body of theoretical work suggests that legislators closer to the chamber median are more attractive and willing candidates to engage in vote buying and hence should receive a disproportionate share of distributive benefits. We investigate this prediction empirically with panel data covering 27 years of federal outlays, using a research design that exploits elections in other districts to identify changes in the relative ideological position of individual legislators. We find a 7% decrease in outlays associated with a one standard-deviation increase in a member’s ideological distance from the median voter. We find the effect of exogenous increases in legislative extremism on outlays to be robust across a wide variety of specifications, and we take special care to distinguish this effect from those induced by potentially confounding covariates, most notably ma...
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