Distributive and Retributive Desert in Rawls

Abstract

John Rawls rejects prejusticial conceptions of distributive desert on the grounds that such conceptions are immoral and impractical. Prejusticial understandings of desert claim that desert can be understood prior to and independently of justice in social institutions, and take legitimate desert claims to provide standards for evaluating social arrangements. Some philosophers have interpreted Rawls’s rejection of distributive desert as extending more broadly to all prejusticial moral concepts, in particular retributive desert. For instance, Michael Sandel (following a line of thought of Robert Nozick’s) has argued that contrary to Rawls’s explicit discussion of desert, Rawls is in fact committed to rejecting retributive desert; the bases (or grounds) for distributive desert are in fact the same bases of retributive desert. Therefore, insofar as retributive desert is part of our commonsense moral outlook, the worry is that Rawls commits himself to a position too far removed from our considered moral convictions. In response to Sandel and other critics, Samuel Scheffler has argued that at least some of Rawls’s reasons for rejecting a prejusticial notion of distributive desert do not commit him to further rejecting a prejusticial notion of retributive desert. Rawls, Scheffler claims, can reasonably and consistently endorse an asymmetrical account of desert; Rawls’s attitude toward desert is therefore not as radical as it may initially seem. More recently, two philosophers have renewed the argument against Rawls’s asymmetrical treatment of desert. Eugene Mills indirectly does so through challenging Scheffler’s interpretation and defense of Rawls, while Jeffrey Moriarty directly attacks Rawls; because, contra Rawls, prejusticial distributive desert can be made sense of, Rawls fails to substantiate desert asymmetry. In this article, I examine and criticize the tenor of these discussions of Rawls. I think both camps—the opposing camp (Sandel, Nozick, Mills, Moriarty), and the supporting (Scheffler)—incorrectly assess how Rawls understands the relationship between justice and desert. Yet I share something important with Scheffler’s view. I take Rawls to be correct in maintaining that distributive and retributive justice are asymmetrical; in this sense, my view is a supporting one. Justice ought not to be conceived as the satisfaction of legitimate desert claims, with distributive justice rewarding economic desert claims and retributive justice answering punitive desert claims. However, I argue that even though this asymmetry holds, Rawls is committed to rejecting prejusticial retributive desert, just as he rejects prejusticial distributive desert; in other words, he is committed to