Abstract

Analyses of conflict between large-scale mining (LSM) and artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in the provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, southeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should take into account the equity and fairness considerations linked to the enforcement of the property rights of corporate and other actors. There is a growing empirical record on the negative distributional consequences of LSM companies’ takeover of mining concessions in the DRC. Also considered by some authors, albeit less examined in the literature, is the distributional impact of mechanisms for clandestine extraction from mine sites taken over by LSM firms. Despite common assumptions about ASM being beyond the control of government authorities to tax or regulate, clandestine mining at LSM sites, and the transport of minerals out of these sites, is frequently authorised and informally and efficiently taxed by security forces and other gatekeepers. Despite the pervasiveness of authorised clandestine mining and the frequent use of force to enforce its rules and regulations, artisanal miners also resist such practices and engage in unauthorised clandestine mining – without the knowledge of the security forces, or by using aggressive tactics to bypass them. The key argument in this piece is that arrangements and processes for clandestine extraction, whether authorised or unauthorised, should not simply be viewed as constituting corruption and a conflict risk, but also have distributional effects, including some positive implications in terms of local resource distribution. This article, which focuses on those who rely, directly or indirectly, on ASM, is based on qualitative research in the DRC over seven and a half months from August 2016-May 2017 at two case-study sites in Haut-Katanga and one in Lualaba.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call