Abstract
Our results show that high-income families place significantly higher value on academic achievement than low-income families. High-income families are also more likely to penalize house price for non-desirable non-academic school quality. This paper uses quantile regression to examine the distribution of demand for school quality. For academic achievement, the average effects as estimated by OLS are biased toward zero due to “aggregation” of families’ willingness to pay. We take advantage of a court-ordered redistricting as a quasi-random assignment of school quality. Subdivision and school fixed-effects are used to control for unobserved characteristics.
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