Distribution channel and licensing strategy choice considering consumer online reviews in a closed-loop supply chain

Abstract

This research builds two-period game models to address the choice issues of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)’s licensing strategy and the Independent Remanufacturer (IR)’s distribution channel, considering consumer online reviews in a closed-loop supply chain. In both periods, the OEM sells new products by the direct distribution channel. In period 2, the OEM determines the licensing strategy (the fixed or royalty fee) to authourize the IR to remanufacture, and then the IR chooses the distribution channel (direct or indirect) for remanufactured products. Interestingly, our results show that the IR prefers the direct channel when the remanufacturing cost is smaller. And the obtained willingness-to-pay (WTP) from consumer online reviews has a positive impact on the threshold value of the remanufacturing cost. Moreover, we find that the OEM’s licensing strategy choice depends on the sizes of the fixed licensing fee and the obtained WTP. The OEM will choose the royalty licensing strategy to the IR who has chosen the direct channel, when the fixed fee and the obtained WTP are smaller. Finally, we find the optimal royalty fee, numerically examine the impact of the interaction among these factors on consumer surplus and social welfare, and relax the basic assumption to show the robustness of our model.