Distributing mind, cognition and language: exploring the (un)common ground with integrational linguistics

Abstract

abstractWhile acknowledging that they have many points of theoretical agreement, the discussion deliberately focuses on areas of incompatibility between integrational and ‘distributed’ approaches to mind, cognition, and language in the light of Roy Harris’ claim that the notion of a ‘distributed mind’ comprises a category mistake. Harris’ position is based on his affirmation of a ‘vulgar concept of mind’ which contrasts sharply with certain accounts of mind originating from within cognitive science. The tension between lay and scientific understandings of mind and language forms a key point of discord between the two approaches. I discuss Harris’ argument that the category mistake inherent in the notion of ‘distributed mind’ can be dissolved by replacing it with the notion of an ‘integrated’ or ‘integrating’ mind. I then consider the derived notion of ‘distributed language’ and its theoretical and explanatory value from an integrational perspective. Finally, I conclude by arguing that although they share many important insights, the differences of perspective which exist between the integrational and distributed approaches are such as likely to prevent the emergence of anything resembling a unified movement.