Distributed Resilient Secondary Control for Islanded DC Microgrids Considering Unbounded FDI Attacks

Abstract

The false data injection (FDI) attack is one of the most common types of cyber attacks in Microgrids (MGs), which threatens the systems’ security by destroying the integrity of the data. In this paper, a distributed resilient secondary control strategy is proposed to solve the issues of voltage restoration and current sharing of direct-current (DC) MG with unbounded FDI attacks. With a proposed distributed observer of local bus voltage, a resilient control algorithm is designed to eliminate the effects of unbounded FDI attacks. The theoretical analysis proves that the proposed control scheme can guarantee the safe and stable operation of MG systems subject to unbounded FDI attacks on the controllers. The experimental results validate that the proposed distributed resilient controller can still achieve the objectives of voltage restoration and current sharing against unbounded FDI attacks.