Abstract

We consider a multi-link interference network that is tapped by an external eavesdropper. To conceal information from the eavesdropper, legitimate links are equipped with transmitter-based friendly jamming (TxFJ) and receiver-based friendly jamming (RxFJ). Each link seeks to maximize its secrecy rate by determining the best power assignment (PA) for the information, TxFJ, and RxFJ signals. Joint optimization of these parameters is a non-convex problem. Hence, we seek sub-optimal solutions. Specifically, we find a lower bound on the allocated power to TxFJ above which positive secrecy is achievable for a given link. Once positive secrecy is achieved, the secrecy rate becomes monotonically increasing in the power at the transmitter (Alice). Therefore, the rest of Alice's power is allocated to the information signal. Despite its sub-optimality, such an approach precludes the possibility of employing successive interference cancellation by the eavesdropper. The RxFJ PA of a link is adjusted using an on-off PA that depends only on the link's local channel state information (CSI). With every link following such a strategy, we model this interaction as a non-cooperative game. We derive sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium. We then propose an algorithm to implement the PA game. Lastly, we relax knowledge of eavesdropper's CSI (E-CSI) and propose a framework that is robust to unknown E-CSI. Our results indicate that this robust framework performs close to when E-CSI is fully known to legitimate links. Moreover, empirically it is shown that the secrecy sum-rate scales with the power budget of transmitters.

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