Abstract

In this paper, we deal with the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a generalized convex game. Each player is associated with a convex cost function and multiple shared constraints. Supposing that each player can exchange information with its neighbors via a connected undirected graph, the objective of this paper is to design a Nash equilibrium seeking law such that each agent minimizes its objective function in a distributed way. Consensus and singular perturbation theories are used to prove the stability of the system. A numerical example is given to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

Highlights

  • How to find a Nash equilibrium is an interesting and important problem for non-cooperative games [1]

  • A generalized convex game usually has continuous strategy spaces and the actions are coupled through both objective functions and constraints

  • Compared with [19], the objective functions and constraints can be coupled arbitrarily; 2) The convergence of the players actions to the normalized Nash equilibrium is analyzed, by using singular perturbation based techniques, it is proven that the proposed algorithms converge into a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the error bound can be arbitrarily small by selecting the control parameters

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Summary

Introduction

How to find a Nash equilibrium is an interesting and important problem for non-cooperative games [1]. The recently proposed algorithm in [18] solved a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for unconstrained non-cooperative games based on average consensus and singular perturbation theory. In [19], discrete-time adaptive algorithms were presented to solve Nash equilibrium seeking problems, the objectives and constraints are required to be neighbor-coupled. We present a continuous-time distributed algorithm to seek a Nash equilibrium for a generalized convex game with shared constraints. Compared with [19], the objective functions and constraints can be coupled arbitrarily; 2) The convergence of the players actions to the normalized Nash equilibrium is analyzed, by using singular perturbation based techniques, it is proven that the proposed algorithms converge into a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the error bound can be arbitrarily small by selecting the control parameters.

Notations and Preliminaries
Problem Formulation
Existence and Uniqueness of the Normalized Nash Equilibrium
Control Design and Stability Analysis
Conclusions

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