Distinguishing true from false memories in forensic contexts: Can phenomenology tell us what is real?

Abstract

AbstractWe studied the extent to which subjective ratings of memory phenomenology discriminate true‐ and false‐memory responses, and whether degree of gist‐based processing influences false memory and phenomenology, in a classic forensic task, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS). Participants heard a narrative of a robbery followed by suggestive questions about the content of the narrative. They were asked to rate the items they recognized as studied using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Consistent with studies of word lists, there were phenomenological differences between true and false memory responses: memory phenomenology was richer for true than for false memories, which supports opponent‐process accounts of false memory such as fuzzy‐trace theory. Thus, phenomenology is a useful means for differentiating experienced from non‐experienced events in forensic contexts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.