Distinguishing Moral Disengagement from Moral Disagreement in a World of Contentious Ethical Issues

Abstract

We critique research on moral disengagement (MD), which presumes widespread agreement about what is right and wrong. While it is appropriate to label justifications of ethical lapses concerning non-contentious issues (e.g., corruption) as MD, many real-world ethical issues, particularly in organizations, are unclear or contested, and subject to reasoned disagreement about what the moral course of action is. We argue that research on MD is less applicable to situations involving moral disagreement, unless fundamental changes to how it is tested are adopted. Moral disagreement arises both because people have different underlying moral foundations that affect how they evaluate situations, and because there are moral dilemmas in which no response can avoid harm or a violation of other deeply-held ethical principles. In this essay, we discuss two important consequences created by assuming moral consensus, and suggest ways to study MD that relax this assumption and allows for disagreement. We argue for the importance of making research on ethics more realistic and applicable to the kinds of moral dilemmas that confront organizations and their members on a more regular basis.