Distinguishing criminal offenses committed in a state of great emotional distress from related corpus delicti of criminal offenses

Abstract

The article examines the positions of scholars, as well as the provisions of current legislation and the draft Criminal Code of Ukraine in terms of distinguishing criminal offenses committed in a state of great emotional distress from related corpus delicti of criminal offenses.
 The author analyzes judicial and law enforcement practice for premeditated murder in a state of great emotional distress, by a mother of her newborn child, and in case of exceeding the limits of necessary defense or in case of exceeding the measures necessary to detain the person who committed the criminal offense.
 The author defines theoretical approaches to the qualification of acts committed in a state of great emotional distress and the position, taking into account the case law, on the distinguishing criminal offenses committed in a state of great emotional distress from related corpus delicti of criminal offenses. It is substantiated that for the correct qualification of crimes committed in a state of strong mental excitement, it is necessary to establish not only the features of the corresponding crimes, but also to distinguish them from the related corpus delicti of crimes, since the type and degree of responsibility of the person for the committed criminal offense, as well as the degree, depend on this punishment, which is imposed in case of finding a person guilty of committing a criminal offense.