Abstract
Abstract What role should distance play in our normative theories? Does distance matter, for instance, in deciding who we must help or who deserves moral concern, so that we have stronger duties to those who are nearer to us than those further away? And what does it mean to be “nearer to us”: Is this a geographical relation or can people be nearer to us in other ways, such as emotionally, culturally, or temporally? These issues are central to deciding some fundamental questions about the nature of our moral commitments: Who is part of the sphere of moral concern – who deserves moral concern? And what shape should that concern take? Does everyone deserve some kind of equal consideration of their interests or is it permissible to give some people's interests considerably more attention in our moral deliberations?
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
