Dissertation Chapter 5: The Dependence Thesis Applied and Tested

Abstract

This Chapter applies the Dependence Thesis to an important problem in political philosophy. It then tests the Thesis against hard cases. By so doing, we aim to lend inductive support to the Thesis, and to demonstrate its usefulness and power. In Part 2, we apply the Thesis to the range problem about basic political principles. This problem was made famous by the monism-dualism debate in political philosophy. The problem concerns whether there is a fundamental normative principle regulating political institutions which does not apply to personal conduct. The view called holds that there cannot be such a principle. The view called holds that there are such principles. Part 2 shows that the Dependence Thesis offers an attractive solution to the problem, one which explains why both monism and dualism seem attractive. In Parts 3-5, we apply the Thesis to three hard cases, cases which prima facie seem to contradict the Thesis. These cases are a normative political theory, a normative group economic theory, and a normative group decision theory, each of them widely considered independent of any normative ethical theory. These are John Rawls's political conception of justice as fairness, the normative part of Gerard Debreu's general equilibrium theory, and the normative part of Buchanan and Tullock's public choice theory of decision rules. Parts 3-5 show that, as the Dependence Thesis predicts, these three theories each depend on a normative ethical theory. They depend on Equal-Respect Contractualism, Paretian Ethics, and Actual Unanimous Consent Ruleism, respectively.