DISSENTING OPINION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL SCIENCE

Abstract

The article deals with the influence of the dissenting opinions of constitutional judges on the development of legal science. This issue is usually very important for constitutional and legal science as its understanding and practical resolution influence the authority of constitutional justice in a state. The dissenting opinion of any judge is their right to express their reasoned disapproval of the rendered decision, formulated in writing and attached to the court decision. Dissenting opinions in constitutional proceedings are of increased importance, because decisions of constitutional courts are aimed to protect law and order in general and are addressed to entire population. The dissenting opinions of constitutional judges contribute to the development of legal science in two aspects. On the one hand, they can contain new ideas, theories and approaches to law, with the help of which new categories and concepts are introduced into scientific discussion. On the other hand, dissenting opinions make often wide references to foreign experience in resolving legal conflicts. In this case, dissenting opinions fit into the framework of comparative legal research and allow taking into account the judicial practice and judicial argumentation of other countries and legal systems. Both aspects contribute to the expansion of the doctrinal base of legal science, pose and solve new problems, increase the need for scientific discussion. This study is based on a formal-dogmatic scientific method, which is aimed at disclosing the true meaning of legal positions of judges presented in dissenting opinions. A systematic method is also used, which allows to identify and classify single areas of scientific knowledge. The author also applies the comparative legal method, which consists in comparing different legal positions in the dissenting opinions of judges. The novelty of the research is in determination of contribution of dissenting opinions of constitutional judges to the development of legal science.