Abstract
The article examines the impact of assembly size on the degree of disproportionality and party system fragmentation. The hypothesis is as follows: assembly size has a negative effect on the degree of disproportionality and a positive effect on the effective number of parties in systems with single-member districts—in proportional electoral systems, by contrast, such a pattern does not exist. In PR systems, notably the average effective threshold supersedes assembly size in explaining the degree of disproportionality and the effective number of parties. Electoral thresholds, ordinal ballots and apparentement, which also have some impact on disproportionality and party system fragmentation in proportional elections, are absent in systems with single-member districts (with the exception of ordinal ballots in alternative vote systems). Moreover, the district magnitude does not vary between electoral districts and countries. Therefore, assembly size is a significant factor in majoritarian systems. The empirical analysis of 550 elections in democratic countries provides support for the hypothesis.
Highlights
The purpose of the study is to examine the impact of assembly size on the disproportionality of election results and party system fragmentation
Do we want to know the threshold which a party has to cross in order to obtain any representation at the national level or do we want to relate the effective threshold to nationwide disproportionality and fragmentation? As in Lijphart’s study Electoral Systems and Party Systems (1994), the national effective threshold calculated on the basis of the average district magnitude is more appropriate here, because we are estimating the impact on nationwide disproportionality and party system fragmentation
Concluding Remarks In Electoral Systems and Party Systems, Lijphart (1994) argued that the assumed influence of assembly size foremost concerns PR systems, and that a possible effect on disproportionality is less plausible in non-PR systems
Summary
Received October 28th, 2011; revised December 10th, 2011; accepted January 5th, 2012. The article examines the impact of assembly size on the degree of disproportionality and party system fragmentation. The hypothesis is as follows: assembly size has a negative effect on the degree of disproportionality and a positive effect on the effective number of parties in systems with single-member districts—in proportional electoral systems, by contrast, such a pattern does not exist. In PR systems, notably the average effective threshold supersedes assembly size in explaining the degree of disproportionality and the effective number of parties. Ordinal ballots and apparentement, which have some impact on disproportionality and party system fragmentation in proportional elections, are absent in systems with single-member districts (with the exception of ordinal ballots in alternative vote systems). The empirical analysis of 550 elections in democratic countries provides support for the hypothesis
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