Dispositional monism and the ontological distinction between unmanifested and manifested powers

Abstract

AbstractThe vast majority of metaphysicians agree that powers (in contrast to categorical properties) can exist unmanifested. This paper focuses on the ontological distinction between unmanifested and manifested powers underpinning that fact and has two main aims. First, to determine the proper relata of the distinction and second, to show that an unrestricted version of dispositional monism faces serious difficulties to accommodate it. As far as the first aim is concerned, it is argued that the distinction in question, in order to be free of irrelevant features, must hold between an unmanifested power‐instance and the same power‐instance being manifested. To the second end, the paper examines two possible candidate distinctions (actual vs. possible, being‐in‐energeia vs. being‐in‐capacity). It is argued that the former fails to be a good fit for the role that the distinction under consideration should play in a dispositional monistic context. It is also argued that a specific version of the latter can ground a promising solution to the difficulty discussed in the paper. That solution, however, presupposes the inclusion of aspects of the Aristotelian metaphysical framework for powers to the dispositional monistic context.