Displaced Homemakers in a No-Fault Regime: An Economic Analysis of Greek Divorce Law

Abstract

In 1983, Greek Family Law was amended on the basis of gender equality and divorce law was liberalized, with the introduction of no-fault divorce and divorce by mutual consent. To assess the wide-ranging effects of the new divorce law on the social and economic status of homemakers in long-duration marriages, we reviewed a sample of 500 reported judicial decisions on maintenance and postdivorce distribution of marital property. We found that the new gender-neutral statutes generally fail to protect the interests of homemakers after divorce. We identify judicial attitudes that misconstrue formal gender equality for substantive equality as a determining factor for such negative outcomes. We discuss a number of problems that seriously compromise a homemaker's chances of receiving a fair share of marital acquests. The most prominent among them is that Greek courts do not apply clear-cut standards in evaluating a homemaker's domestic services, thus attaching a low value to their contributions within marriage. We introduce a new reliance-based model for Greek alimony law that judges can utilize to determine the non-pecuniary contributions of homemakers and propose specific amendments to the current statutes that are grounded on economic terms like human capital.