Disinformation, Digital Information Equality, and Electoral Integrity

Abstract

Digital information attacks to a country’s electoral integrity have been recognized as a cybersecurity threat by several governments. Disinformation, defined as information that is intentionally false or deliberately misleading, is especially hard to regulate in the elections context, where the free flow of political discourse is an integral part of public confidence in the electoral process but must be balanced with the impact of false information that could undermine public confidence in the electoral process and undermine the ability of voters to participate meaningfully in the electoral process. Electoral disinformation campaigns intentionally deceive voters, thereby disrupting the notion of fair elections. Over-regulation of political speech, however, can imperil the political participation of the informed voter, who in turn engages and influences other voters. Policies for regulating electoral disinformation must therefore balance the tension between curbing speech and encouraging voters to engage in political participation through the free flow of information. Canadian elections law offers a possible solution for jurisdictions seeking to effectively regulate disinformation without unduly stifling free expression through the principle of “information equality,” which predates the recent discussions around online disinformation. The principle of information equality as originally conceptualized notably did not necessarily protect access to true or accurate information. Instead, information equality was supposed to ensure that voters have access to the same information at roughly the same time. In the modern context of rising threats of cyber-disinformation, where disinformation can be generated quickly and remotely and spread rapidly and to precise targets, we argue information equality should address the perception and reality of electoral unfairness arising from disinformation, where voters are subjected to poor quality information that is difficult to restrain and difficult to correct. Accordingly, we argue for an updated principle of digital information equality that would seek to protect the quality of information that voters receive at election time, and we apply this principle of digital information equality to address the harms of disinformation in the elections context. By re-invigorating the principle of information equality and adapting it from a theoretical concept to a regulatory device, this paper proposes a new method to regulate electoral disinformation while supporting an informed electorate, respecting democratic principles, and protecting electoral integrity. In so doing, the paper identifies three examples of harmful electoral disinformation that warrant increased regulation and concludes with a series of recommendations for other jurisdictions seeking to regulate disinformation in the electoral context.