Dishonest Appropriation after Gomez and Hinks

Abstract

This article examines the meaning of dishonest appropriation in the offence of theft after the House of Lords' decisions in Gomez and Hinks. It maintains that whilst Gomez broke the distinction in the Theft Act 1968 between the simple thief and the deceitful rogue, it did at least maintain the underlying rationale for theft which is the protection of property rights. In contrast Hinks does not comply with this rationale as it allows for the possibility of an appropriation when there was a valid gift of property so that the actus reus of theft no longer requires that there be the composite whole of a ‘dishonest appropriation’. Thus the emphasis in the offence of theft is now on dishonesty and this may be in violation of Articles 5(1) and 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.