Abstract
AbstractThe proliferation of Anti‐Dumping actions may be explained by the Most Favored Nation rule of safeguards, the advantages of unilateral retaliatory measures as an alternative to formal dispute resolution, and the exercising of discipline in a risk‐sharing agreement. Use of unilateralism is attractive to developing members that are constrained by legal capacity. The expression of the Anti‐Dumping Agreement appears to be a hybrid of rules and standards. However, a lack of interpretive guidance from the WTO and the opportunities for discretion in the implementation of rules render them standards in a shroud of rules. This is due to the presence of large proxy spaces, or the domestic investigative authority being substantially the arbiter of satisfaction with the agreement.
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