Abstract
This paper addresses a very important and rich topic for accounting research: what are the incentives for making voluntary disclosures to an efficient capital market when private information has more than one dimension? There are many aspects to this topic, and I will use this discussion as a vehicle for discussing four of them. In particular, this discussion addresses aggregation, coding schemes, auditing, and sender-receiver models. Particular aspects of the paper are used to illustrate various points about these general ideas.
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