Abstract
This article analyzes the problems of governing post-1997 Hong Kong by applying the veto players approach. Previous works in this area placed little emphasis on the actors who could actually create problems for the government by opposing changes—the veto players. In this research, administrative elites and the business sector are regarded as veto players in the system. To improve governance and achieve its ideal “executive-led” model, it is argued that Beijing has attempted to weaken the veto players by adopting different strategies, despite granting them their power in the first place. This article contributes to the literature by offering a novel perspective on the problems in the governance of Hong Kong, as well as providing implications for the dynamics of national-regional relationships.
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