Abstract
In recent years, senior judges in Britain have signalled a departure from the longestablished but for test used for direct discrimination cases. They appear to favour instead that the defendant held a discriminatory motive, or even hostility, for liability. In the United States, courts have settled upon a requirement for discriminatory motive, but afforded it such a broad interpretation that is scarcely distinguishable from the but for model, and is a convenient, if inaccurate label. This paper aims to demonstrate, using seven kinds of direct discrimination case, that neither a discriminatory motive doctrine, nor the but for test, are suitable models to analyse direct discrimination claims, and that the proper approach is a simple purposive interpretation of the statutory formula provided in both the UK and the US.
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