Discriminative stimuli as determinants of consonance and dissonance

Abstract

A factorial experiment was conducted in which counterattitudinal advocacy was elicited from independent groups of subjects under either of two levels of decision freedom and in the presence of one of three distinctively colored stimulus lights. For all subjects one light had been previously established as a discriminative stimulus for making truthful statements (truth light), a second light had been established as the discriminative stimulus for making false statements (lie right), and a third light had not been previously illuminated (control light). As predicted, stimulus conditions during advocacy differentially affected postexperimental attitudes only when the subject was allowed relatively great freedom to refuse to make a tape recording of counterattitudinal statements, and postexperimental attitudes were most congruent with behavior when advocacy was elicited under conditions of free choice in the presence of the truth light. The implications of these results for dissonance theory and the more recently enunciated self-judgment model of attitude change are discussed.