Discretion for whom? Local policies and the agency problem between politicians and care managers in Swedish social service

Abstract

ABSTRACT Research on social work’s relation to local political decisions and the design of political policy documents is scarce. This paper analyses the design of local political policies for elder care in Sweden’s 290 municipalities. The policies determine delegation, i.e. care managers’ legal right to make decisions about the welfare services given to older people. By mapping documents for delegation, the results show that care managers’ delegation varies considerably between municipalities, e.g. by the decision-making being conditioned to local political guidelines, or by consultation with a manager. The Principal Agent theory (PAT) is used to discuss the findings. Analysed through the PAT, care managers can be understood as agents set to perform tasks on behalf of the politicians. Local policies can be viewed as a tool for political control by minimising risks of unpredictability and arbitrariness in decision-making. This raises questions about the role of care managers and the extent of their professional freedom while assessing needs to ensure older people a reasonable standard of living. The results highlight the importance of accounting for the structural political context and its consequences for frontline bureaucrats.