Discourse analysis of the US War on Terror policy in Afghanistan

Abstract

This paper discusses discourse analysis on the “war on terror” after 9/11. It argues that the USA framed a specific discourse based on securing and legitimizing its political and strategic objectives in the war on terror in Afghanistan. This study uses the qualitative method of discourse analysis to analyse official texts and key statements by the U.S. Government on the war on terror after 9/11. It explains that the U.S. discourse on the war on terror resulted from the geo-strategic overstretch policy. The withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan was a failure of discourse; however, it questioned the rationale of the protracted war on terror. Political and strategic discourses help to frame a policy in an ideational perspective while the reversal of discourses indicates a paradigm shift based on sheer rationality. The study has far-reaching implications for future research particularly in the case of hegemonic discourse which tends to fail or reverse the U.S. discourse about countering terrorism in Afghanistan. It reveals the fact that discourses are constructed much for public consumption and the U.S. strategy of withdrawal from Afghanistan is primarily based on domestic economic and political considerations.