Discordant Allies: Trans-Tasman Relations in the Aftermath of the ANZUS Treaty, 1951–1955

Abstract

ABSTRACTContrary to popular belief, the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty did little to encourage an immediate closer political relationship between Australia and New Zealand. The Tasman powers disagreed on major strategic issues and cooperation was minimal (and in some cases entirely absent). Focusing on the development of trans-Tasman relations between 1951 and 1955, this article examines Australian and New Zealand views pertaining to the scope and implementation of the ANZUS Treaty, proposals for the Five Power Staff Agency in Southeast Asia, the “United Action” proposal during the 1954 Indochina Crisis and the “Operation Oracle” project during the 1954–1955 Quemoy–Matsu Crisis. This article advances the conclusion that Australia and New Zealand mainly disagreed on these issues due to competing views about their respective political relationships with the United States and Britain. In other words, in the immediate post-treaty period, closer trans-Tasman political relations were ultimately hindered by strong divisions over accepting the United States instead of Britain as the cornerstone of their respective foreign policies.