Abstract
We study a disclosure game in which a sender privately knows how much information she possesses and can disclose verifiable information to persuade a receiver to provide a higher reward. The receiver may attribute any imprecise disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable information. We show that the most unfavorable possibility contained in information possessed by the sender will be fully revealed to the receiver.
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