Disclosure strategy for critical infrastructure under common knowledge of ‘naive government’

Abstract

This paper analyzes the disclosure policies of critical infrastructures under the threat of terrorism by use of subjective game theory. A terror risk of critical infrastructures depends on terrorists' motive to attack them. Therefore, it is expected that the proper implementation of protection and disclosure about critical infrastructures can contribute to the reduction of terror risk. To analyze the disclosure policies, this paper introduces a virtual figure of the government named “naive government”. Countries which do not have continuous relationships with terror groups have not regarded the threat of terrorism as their actual risk which threatens their society. It is often the case where the government and the citizens share common knowledge that the government does not take any countermeasures against terror attacks. This paper refers to such a government figure as “naive government”. Under the common knowledge of naive government, this paper analyzes the disclosure policies about 1) the government's warning level, and 2) the implementation of protective countermeasure against terror attacks. It is shown that both of the disclosure policies are effective with respect to the reduction of terror risk. In addition, it is shown that the latter disclosure policy is superior to the former policy.