Disclosure of value-based performance measures: evidence from German listed firms

Abstract

We examine the determinants of the disclosure of value-based (VB) performance measures in Germany. We argue that firms are more likely to disclose VB performance measures when information asymmetry is greater, as greater information asymmetry means firms have a greater need to credibly signal a shareholder value orientation. Using a hand-collected dataset of German listed firms covering 1,528 firm-years from 2004 to 2011, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to disclose a VB performance measure if the free float is larger than the blocking minority and also, when firms are large, if they have high foreign sales to total sales ratios and are not cross-listed internationally. Our results indicate that German firms use VB performance measures to improve investor communication and to substantiate their shareholder value orientation. Our results should be interpreted against a background of increased shareholder value orientation and sophisticated cost accounting in German firms.