Abstract
We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms’ reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, as well as information production, litigation and proprietary costs. More specifically, we propose that a firm's decisions to disclose reserves in the annual report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory.
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