Disclosure of pension asset allocation and expected rate of return management

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether the expected rate of return (ERR) management is related to disclosure of pension asset allocation. FAS 132R(1), which requires firms to disaggregate the detailed categories of pension asset allocation, provides a natural experiment setting for investigating the effect of enhanced transparency on firm behavior.Design/methodology/approachThe authors focus on the variation of voluntary disclosure and its effect on ERR management under the two different reporting regimes. The authors measure the variation of voluntary disclosure of the pension asset allocations in the pre-period of FAS 132R(1), by using the self-constructed disclosure score.FindingsFirst, firms create flexibility in their choice of ERR through opaque disclosure of pension asset allocation. Next, firms with poor disclosures are more likely to adjust ERR downward when accounting standards require greater transparency, implying that, for firms with poor disclosures, mandated transparency in pension asset allocation plays a vital role in reducing the ERR management.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors directly illustrate the impact of FAS 132R(1) on ERR management. The authors find that the impact of mandated transparency is not uniform across firms. Next, this study highlights the importance of disclosure in restricting managers’ earnings management motivation.Originality/valueThe authors hand collect the asset allocations under pre-FAS 132R(1) period from the 10-K pension footnotes for all S&P 500 firms, which allows the authors to identify the disclosure variation amongst the firms. Based on the variation of disclosure, the authors construct the ordinal measure of disclosure scores on which the testing indicator variables are built.