Disaster risk reduction amidst armed conflict: informal institutions, rebel groups, and wartime political orders.

Abstract

Extant research has explored the effect of natural hazards on the risk of armed conflict, but very few studies have examined how conflict dynamics affect disaster risk reduction (DRR), including climate change adaptation. This is surprising given the empirical evidence that indicates how often disasters and armed conflicts collide. To understand better the impact of armed conflict on DRR, this paper develops a conceptual typology that is based on rebel groups' territorial control and on the strength of informal institutions. It documents three main political orders amid conflict: rebel stability; informal stability; and fragmented landscape. These wartime political orders will have different effects on DRR and other development programmes, revealing the importance of desegregating armed conflict to facilitate tailor-made and more efficient interventions. The paper provides empirical evidence from Mali and the Philippines that illustrates the influence of these wartime political orders on DRR programmes.