Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s)

Abstract

This article looks to the first formulations of �restrictive interpretation� to identify with precision the content and meaning of this rule. First Vattel affirmed that odious clauses should be interpreted restrictively. Then, under the Permanent Court and the first decades of the ICJ, a restrictive interpretation emerged in favour of state sovereignty. Later, with the approval of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969, the interpretation favourable to state sovereignty was abandoned in favour of an alleged neutral way of interpreting treaties. However, a new restrictive interpretation (of sovereignty) was established, as an expression of the new values emerging in international law. This interpretation was obtained by means of the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an explicit argument, and Latin maxims. Through a parallel analysis of jurisdictions which hear claims between private parties and states, such as the Strasbourg and the San Jose Courts, and the ICSID arbitrations, the article reaches the conclusion that this mode of interpretation reveals some inconsistencies. It concludes, however, that international law already has the means to address these issues.