Abstract
What ought one to do, epistemically speaking, when one encounters a disagreement? John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan argue that the search for satisfying and stable answers to this question will not be rewarded. This is because of the fact of non-transparency: that there are no conditions (including mental state conditions) such that we are always in a position to know whether they obtain. Non-transparency creates systematic problems for the project of formulating intuitive and stable epistemic norms. This chapter illustrates how this plays out in the special case of disagreement. It concludes with some tentative remarks about where this might leave the problem of disagreement, and the project of formulating epistemic norms more generally.
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