Abstract
The literature on policy dynamics has long argued for a better conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable (“policy”), but this fundamental point has often been neglected in the policy feedback literature. In this paper, we explore how far disaggregating policy into different elements (policy instruments, objectives, and settings) addresses this gap. We do so by examining the world’s largest market-based climate policy instrument—emissions trading in the European Union—and reveal a number of valuable new insights. First, even if positive policy feedback locks in a policy instrument, actor contestation does not disappear, but narrows down to the more detailed level of policy settings. Second, feedback may operate differently at each policy level: the policy instrument and its settings may strengthen at the same time as support for broader objectives weakens. Finally, positive feedback may simultaneously strengthen opposing actors’ support for multiple policy elements, leading to a form of “policy stability by stalemate.” These findings highlight the need for a new, interdisciplinary phase of policy feedback research that more fully disaggregates the dependent variable across a wider range of policy areas and policy instrument types. Policy scientists are well equipped to contribute to and benefit from such a debate.
Highlights
The policy feedback literature has made important empirical and theoretical advances in recent years, building on Schattschneider’s observation that “new policies create a new politics” (1935, p. 288)
We focus on a key gap in the existing literature: the nature of the dependent variable, i.e., “policy.” In the past, many scholars have focused on policy feedback mechanisms, i.e., how “policy creates a new politics” (Jacobs and Weaver 2015, pp. 444–450; Pierson 1993, p. 626; Skocpol 1992, p. 58)
We have demonstrated that a more disaggregated approach to the dependent variable provides a richer understanding of policy feedback
Summary
The policy feedback literature has made important empirical and theoretical advances in recent years, building on Schattschneider’s observation that “new policies create a new politics” (1935, p. 288). Positive resource/incentive feedback mechanisms helped push the electricity generation industry to unite in support of the instrument, in part because they were able to pass on a high proportion of their allowance costs to energy consumers
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