Dirty Hands and Moral Conflict \u2013 Lessons from the Philosophy of Evil

Christina Nick

doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00385-9

Abstract

According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty hands. So, what sets the two apart? The dirty hands literature has offered widely different answers to this question but there has been relatively little discussion about their relative merits as well as challenges. In this paper I evaluate these different accounts by making clear which understanding of concept distinctness underlies them and which of them is, ultimately, the most plausible one in the case of dirty hands and ordinary moral conflict. In order to do so, I will borrow from the terminology employed in recent debates in the philosophy of evil which have tackled a similar problem to the one at hand, i.e. defining what sets evil apart from ordinary wrongdoing. Here it has been argued that concepts could be distinct in three ways: they can have a quantitative difference, a strong qualitative or a moderate qualitative difference. I conclude that the most convincing definition of dirty hands draws a moderate qualitative distinction between ordinary moral conflict according to which dirty hands are those moral conflicts that involve a serious violation or betrayal of a core moral value.

Highlights

In order to avoid this conclusion, we could attempt to show that dirty hands are strongly qualitatively distinct from ordinary moral conflict in that the former possesses a property that is entirely absent in instances of the latter
We considered that what is unique to dirty hands could be that they are caused by the immoral actions of others or that they involve forego‐ ing a core moral value
It would make sense to add an extremity condition ensuring that more trivial instances of moral conflict could not count as getting one’s hands dirty

Summary

Introduction

While we can see that this is a moral conflict in which you have to violate something of moral value but only do so to pursue something else of moral value, we would not want to say that you got your hands dirty by staying to help the victims of the acci‐ dent rather than keeping your promise to your friend to go for coffee. It would not be appropriate for you to feel seriously anguished and morally polluted by your choice; instead, a form of regret may be more appropriate. Accounts of the difference between dirty hands and ordinary moral conflict that have been offered in the literature. I will argue that the most convincing defi‐ nition of dirty hands draws a modest qualitative distinction between ordinary moral conflicts according to which dirty hands are those moral conflicts that involve a seri‐ ous violation or betrayal of a core moral value

Quantitative Distinctness

Qualitative Distinctness

External Immoralities

Core Value Condition

Conclusion