Abstract

This paper argues, using India as a case study, that constitutional directives can be a useful tool for the expressive accommodation of ideological dissenters who would otherwise lose out in constitutional negotiations in deeply divided societies. The strategy of expressive accommodation was tempered in the Indian case through containment and constitutional incrementalism. A calibrated expressive accommodation of ideological dissenters can give them enough (and genuine) hope of future victories to keep them on board, without going so far that the majority rejects the accommodation or their ideological opponents in turn leave the constitutional negotiation table. By focussing on the accommodational needs of ideological dissenters, this paper adds to existing literature on constitutional consensus-building techniques, which has largely focussed on political insurance for ethnocultural minorities.

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