Direction of policy in Palestine, 1936–45

Abstract

The years preceding World War Two witnessed significant changes in British policy in Palestine. These changes were at one and the same time the cause and effect of a radical re-adjustment of the British policymaking machine (for want of a better name) responsible for Palestine. Until 1936, Britain had administered the Palestine Mandate in the light of a reasonably objective judgement of the respective rights of Zionists and Arabs. To a considerable degree, policy-making had been delegated by Cabinet and Colonial Secretary to the permanent officials in London and to the men on the spot in Palestine. But the Arab Rebellion which began in April, 1936 and continued intermittently until the eve of war, involved the moral sympathy, political support and even the physical intervention of certain of the Arab States. The increasing involvement of the Arab world in Palestinian affairs of necessity led to an increasing and ultimately dominating interest on the part of the Foreign Office. With the security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean at stake policy in Palestine could no longer be left in the hands of officials, whether in London or Jerusalem. London could no longer afford the luxury of considering the problems of Palestine in isolation from the rest of the Middle East. The re-assumption of ministerial and Cabinet control over policy in Palestine was neither swift nor smooth. Ministers relied heavily on the opinions of their permanent staff, especially when they themselves were new and often ephemeral incumbents. Baldwin's leadership in Cabinet was weak, collective responsibility sadly lacking. Baldwin took little interest in foreign affairs, and believed that Ministers should run their own Departments, with himself on hand to settle disputes or give advice. 1 If during 1935-36 the Cabinet dithered for months over its attitude to Italy, it could not be expected to re-assert swift control over a troubled colony. Government machinery for dealing with Arabian and Middle Eastern problems generally still showed a remarkable lack of unified direction. Apart from the traditional, major, but rather obscure divisions between the responsibilities of on the one hand, the Foreign Office and, on the other, of the India Office and the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, policy in Iraq (until its official independence in 1932), Transjordan and Palestine was the responsibility of the Colonial Office.2 Defence policy in the Middle East had been placed in the hands of the Air Ministry during Churchill's tenure at the Colonial Office in 1921, but the despatch of troops in considerable numbers to Palestine in 1936 led to an ad hoc assumption of general command by the G.O.C. of the Army. The Admiralty was concerned for its part with the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf Ports as stop-offs on the Imperial route to India and as terminal ports for oil supplies.