DIRECTING DEMOCRACY

Abstract

2 6 Y D I R E C T I N G D E M O C R A C Y F R A N C E S M c C A L L R O S E N B L U T H A N D I A N S H A P I R O One could almost hear a collective sigh of relief on 8 May 2017 when France’s voters elected Emmanuel Macron to be their president . In choosing a political moderate and a pro-European, the French not only repudiated the xenophobic politics of Marine Le Pen; they they also held out hope to the rest of the world that Britain’s June 2016 decision to leave the European Union and America’s election of Donald J. Trump were aberrational. Perhaps the world may not, after all, descend into isolationism and global disintegration. The disastrous aftermath of the economic nationalism of the 1930s is recent history, well remembered. Macron’s triumph notwithstanding, fear-mongering is a favorite political trick because it works. When voters can be convinced that other countries are grabbing their jobs or are exporting killers, they may vote for policies that prove calamitous in the long run. Think about the temporary popularity bump George W. Bush enjoyed from the ‘‘shock and awe’’ attack on Iraq, a popularity that got him elected for a second term. That’s not all. Trade protectionism and anti-immigrant policies damage the economy, and to the extent that global economic integration is a major brake on wars 2 7 R by spreading around a stake in others’ prosperity, economic nationalism is also bad for national security. Winston Churchill once quipped that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others. If true, how can democracies best combat the false promises of the likes of Britain’s Nigel Farage, Trump, and Le Pen? These politicians are, after all, populists who appeal to ordinary people. Is there something wrong with democracy itself, given how easily ordinary people are fooled, as Plato warned? Churchill might be right about democracy’s ability to muddle through in the long run, but we often reach for the wrong solutions first. The e√orts since the 1960s to bring politics closer to the people – through primaries, local caucuses, ballot initiatives, referenda , and plebiscites – are well-meaning measures that have instead set back the public’s ability to render governments accountable . The reforms have disabled political parties, the institutions best positioned to craft and compete over policies that make sense over the long haul and for the most people. Voters are vulnerable to shallow claims when political parties lack the ability to hold their member-politicians to a party line and are thereby unable to defend the party’s long-term reputation for coherent, consistent policies. Rebuilding a well-functioning democracy requires reversing this trend and restoring party competition. A great paradox of politics is that hierarchical parties are vital for healthy democracy. If parties cannot bear the costs of informing and mobilizing voters, they are at an immense disadvantage relative to interest groups. But for parties to be e√ective in this role, they must compete with one another over the policies that – if elected – they will actually implement as governments. To foster electoral accountability, parties must be large and strong. Weakening party control over decisions, candidates, and leadership selection creates only the illusion of more grassroots democracy. In reality, it empowers intense minorities at the expense of most voters, and it promotes the capture, corruption, and lack of responsiveness that leads people to demand decentralizing control in the first place. Parties with strong internal hierarchies are best able to deliver on policy promises, particularly concerning policies that are important for long-term economic growth and 2 8 R O S E N B L U T H A N D S H A P I R O Y development. The more valuable a party’s public identity and reputation, the more voters can trust that the party is not favoring short-term measures at long-term cost. Design Flaws and Reforms in American History America’s founding fathers did not...