Diplomatic Support of US Involvement In The Korean War June 25 – July 6 1950: Crisis Response Experience

Abstract

The article is about the history of US involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953) in the middle of summer 1950. This problem is considered as a prototype of Washington’s general approach to the organization of diplomatic support for its intervention in local conflicts. Research is based on published and unpublished documents of the diplomatic departments of the USSR and the USA, declassified CIA materials and memoirs of direct participants of the events. A convenient instrument for legitimizing US interference in the conflict was the UN Security Council. Washington’s actions were justified by its resolutions adopted thanks to a boycott of the UN SC by the Soviet representative. At the same time, the history of local conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries show that the US can use other rather weak excuses for military interventions. Along with legitimization of intervention, in the early days of the Korean War, American diplomacy worked on localization of the conflict, isolation of the theater of war, formed an UN based international coalition to participate in war, neutralized Washington’s political opponents in the international arena, and coordinated assistance to Republic of Korea. The US State Department and intelligence agencies usually perform these functions in support of armed interventions in conflicts in various regions of the world today. The content of Washington’s reaction to the situation in Korea illustrates another important feature of US foreign policy, which still remains relevant today – the rejection of any deals with violators of the US-established world order, even in the initially unfavorable military and political conditions. Washington did not refuse to negotiate a truce, but even in the conditions of catastrophic defeats of the South Korean army, a peace dialogue could be started only after the restoration of the status quo.