Dilemmas of public goods provisioning: institutional mechanisms for agricultural drainage management in Ohio, USA

Abstract

Institutions are critical for collective action around several environmental policy issues. A seldom-studied issue, agricultural drainage, provides a rich setting to examine how institutional mechanisms interact with two variables linked to collective action: group size and heterogeneity. In this study, we examine institutions for establishing and maintaining agricultural drainage systems in the Western Lake Erie Basin region of Ohio. Specifically, we examine whether and how drainage management institutions interact with two variables, group size and heterogeneity in benefits and costs, for solving the public-good dilemmas of agricultural drainage. Data for this study come from a comparative case study design, using semi-structured in-depth interviews, and a landowner survey. Results suggest that the Olson effect for group size is mediated by institution type, and heterogeneity in benefits and costs is mediated by fairness perceptions, in affecting incentives for collective action. We discuss our findings in light of theories of collective action.